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A B S T R A C T   
Leaders often engage in costly, self-interested behaviors when they have the power and discretion to do so. 
Because followers are well-positioned to reduce these behaviors, I test how a specific follower communica-
tion—sarcasm expression—affects a particularly costly behavior: leader overpay. In three behavioral experi-
ments and a field study (Ns = 240–526), I test the effect of follower sarcasm on leaders’ self-pay. I also test a 
moderator—leader moral identity—because leaders with low moral identity are more likely to overpay them-
selves and are more open to social norm violations (including follower sarcasm), as well as a mechanism—leader 
accountability—because I propose that follower sarcasm decreases leaders’ overpay by increasing leaders’ 
perceived accountability. As expected, follower sarcasm reduced leader overpay (vs. the control/no humor and 
vs. non-sarcastic humor), especially for leaders with weak moral identity. Study 3 replicated these results while 
showing explicit evidence of the accountability mechanism. Study 4 further supported these ideas with corre-
lational data from real leaders recalling a more (vs. less) sarcastic follower, but only when the sarcasm was 
publicly (vs. privately) enacted. While talk is cheap, these results show that follower sarcasm can also be 
valuable, because it reduces leaders’ overpay by increasing accountability.   
1. Introduction 
Leaders often engage in self-interested behavior when they have the 
power and discretion to do so, including awarding themselves with 
overly generous benefits and bonuses (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; 
Kaplan, 2008; Morris, 2020; Rus, van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2012; 
Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). Because leader compensation is 
often uncorrelated with performance, particularly negative performance 
(Kaplan, 2008; Olaniyi, 2019), and leaders’ overpay also negatively 
affects their followers and organizations (Cobb & Frey, 1996; Finkelstein 
& Boyd, 1998; Steffens, Haslam, Peters, & Quiggin, 2020; Wade et al., 
2006), leaders’ overpay can also be considered unjustified or immoral. 
Because of these damaging consequences, it is important to understand 
how such behaviors can be mitigated. 
Various governance practices reduce leaders’ self-interested be-
haviors by increasing accountability (e.g., policy, monitoring, and 
stakeholder action; Castilla, 2015; Fox, 2015; Kaplan, 2008), although 
it remains unclear if these systems effectively reduce such behaviors 
(see Rus et al., 2012). Furthermore, these governance practices tend to 
target top-level executives, while lower- and mid-level leaders maintain 
much discretion over aspects of their pay and benefits (Abraham, 2017; 
Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Because humor1 facilitates articulating 
critical messages (Collinson, 2002; Grugulis, 2002), especially more 
aggressive, teasing humor—such as sarcasm—which can effectively 
convey (managerial) resistance (Korczynski, 2011), I proffer follower 
humor can reduce leaders’ self-interested behaviors. That is, to address 
overpay (i.e., pay in excess of one’s objective, performance-based 
earnings) in lower- and mid-level leaders, I test a cost-free interven-
tion: follower sarcasm (i.e., the construction of or exposure to contra-
dictions between stated and intended meanings directed at a specific 
person; Huang, Gino, & Galinsky, 2015; Lee & Katz, 1998). I also test if 
sarcasm is more effective in triggering behavioral change in leaders 
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who are at the greatest risk of self-interested behavior: leaders with 
weak moral identity (DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012), 
namely, a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits such as 
honest and fair (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
Scholars have long hinted at the links between power and humor. 
Ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle conceptualized humor 
as a form of mockery (Aristotle, 1939), wherein humor users exert su-
periority, often over others (Gruner, 1997; Hobbes, 1840). Thus, 
although power (i.e., the asymmetric control over valued resources; 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008) increases power holders’ self-interested be-
haviors (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Smith, 2013), 
follower humor may reduce perceived hierarchical-differences related 
to power (Cooper, 2008; Dwyer, 1991; Rodrigues & Collinson, 1995), 
reducing power holders’ overpay. More precisely, I propose that a spe-
cific form of humor—sarcasm—triggers accountability, “the implicit or 
explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, 
feelings, and actions to others” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, p. 255). 
Sarcasm is a known managerial mockery and control tactic, lubricating 
messages up the hierarchy that would be otherwise ineffective or inex-
pressible (Korczynski, 2011). Such a tactic may be especially effective 
for leaders with weak moral identity, because they may be most likely to 
overpay themselves and more open to social norm violations (Yam, 
Christian, Wei, Liao, & Nai, 2018), such as upward sarcastic humor 
expression. 
Together, this research extends the leadership and power literatures 
by integrating the humor literature. A rich body of work has shown the 
(mostly positive) effects of humor for those in positions of power 
(Avolio, Howell, & Sosik, 1999; Cheng, Amarnani, Le, & Restubog, 
2019; Cooper & Sosik, 2012; Decker & Rotondo, 2001; Hughes & Avey, 
2009; Lundberg, 1969; Robinson & Smith-Lovin, 2001; Vecchio, Justin, 
& Pearce, 2009; Yam et al., 2018; see Kong, Cooper, & Sosik, 2019, for a 
review). However, this research is often conducted in the typical di-
rection of power relations (Dosier, Case, & Keys, 1988) known as au-
thority ranking relationships (Fiske, 1991, 1992). By flipping the 
hierarchy, I test if follower sarcasm triggers the opposite effect: although 
leaders may use sarcasm to reinforce existing hierarchies, followers can 
use sarcasm to reduce the same hierarchies by increasing accountability. 
In doing so, this research also contributes to the humor literature by 
testing humor’s effectiveness to communicate up the hierarchy, that is, 
from a follower to a leader. Existing studies have examined humor use 
within approximately the same hierarchical level (e.g., Evans, Slaughter, 
Ellis, & Rivin, 2019; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 2014; Prusaczyk & 
Hodson, 2020; Thai, Borgella, & Sanchez, 2019; Terrion & Ashforth, 
2002; Thomas et al., 2020) or down the hierarchy (i.e., a leader with 
their followers; e.g., Avolio et al., 1999; Cooper, Kong, & Crossley, 2018; 
Yam et al., 2018; Yam et al., 2019; see Kong et al., 2019, for a review). 
But because higher status and power entail a broader range of accept-
able behavior (see Magee & Galinsky, 2008, for a review), followers may 
not reap the same benefits as leaders when using humor with an au-
thority person. Thus, the current research complements related quali-
tative research (e.g., Dwyer, 1991; Korczynski, 2011) by quantitatively 
testing if upward sarcasm can indeed elicit benefits by examining its 
effect on leaders’ behaviors, namely, leaders’ pay recommendations for 
themselves. 
Finally, contributing to the humor and behavioral ethics literatures, 
recent research has begun to explore humor and leader morality (e.g., 
Yam et al., 2018; Yam et al., 2019). Chiefly relevant here, Yam et al. 
(2018) showed that aggressive leader sense of humor increases follower 
deviance. The current research aims to extend this work by testing if 
follower sarcasm—often framed as a mild form of aggressive humor 
(see Huang et al., 2015; Yam et al., 2018)—decreases leader deviance. 
Put simply, while aggressive leader humor signals the acceptability of 
norm violations, thereby increasing followers’ immoral behaviors (Yam 
et al., 2018), I propose that aggressive follower humor signals 
accountability, thereby decreasing leaders’ immoral behaviors. In the 
following, I describe the relevant theory and literature leading up to my 
hypotheses, which I test and replicate with three behavioral experi-
ments and a field study. 
1.1. Self-interested behavior in leaders with weak moral identity 
When leaders have high power, they tend to show more self- 
interested and fewer group-interested responses (e.g., DeCelles et al., 
2012; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner et al., 
2003; Maner & Mead, 2010; Mead & Maner, 2012). When people have 
more power, they tend to place greater importance on their own interests 
while also subordinating others’ interests (Keltner et al., 2003). This idea 
is also supported by the social distance theory of power, because with 
greater power comes greater social distance and construal level (Lam-
mers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013), which 
may also increase leaders’ self-focus/decrease their other-focus. 
Research in moral psychology has shown similar effects, albeit 
through a different mechanism. This work has shown that people 
emphasize their needs over others because of their moral identity 
(Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Reed & Aquino, 2003). 
As previously stated, moral identity involves a self-conception orga-
nized around a set of moral traits (e.g., caring, fair, and honest; Aquino 
& Reed, 2002). Generally, people who value these traits engage in more 
ethical behavior and less unethical behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed 
& Aquino, 2003; Yam et al., 2018). 
Integrating the power and moral identity literatures, DeCelles et al. 
(2012) showed that power and moral identity interact to predict in-
dividuals’ self-interested behavior. Specifically, power made those with 
low moral identity less aware of the moral implications of their actions. 
In turn, power holders prioritized their own interests and committed 
more self-interested behaviors (e.g., more chances to win money and 
more organizational deviance). Because leaders in all studies have 
power (e.g., discretion over resources such as pay), I formally propose: 
Hypotheses 1a-b. Leaders engage in overpay, (b) particularly those 
with weaker (vs. stronger) moral identity. 
1.2. Sarcasm reduces leaders’ self-interested behavior via accountability 
A rich stream of quantitative research has examined the effects of 
leaders’ humor with their followers (e.g., Avolio et al., 1999; Cooper 
et al., 2018; Yam et al., 2018; Yam et al., 2019; see Kong et al., 2019, for 
a review). Yet, of the work that has explicitly considered hierarchical 
differences, it is often in the typical direction of power relations (i.e., 
top-down; Dosier et al., 1988; Fiske, 1991, 1992). Some qualitative and 
theoretical research has discussed the function of humor in hierarchical 
relationships (e.g., Cooper, 2008; Holmes, 2000; Rodrigues & Collinson, 
1995); in general, this work confirms the idea that leaders use humor to 
maintain and reinforce their positions of power, while also acknowl-
edging the possibility that followers can use humor to express dissent to 
challenge the power structures within which leaders operate. In other 
words, humor may break down the interpersonal barriers of formal hi-
erarchies (Locke, 1996; Vinton, 1989), increasing leader accountability 
and reducing leaders’ self-interested acts. 
Sarcasm may be a particularly effective form of follower humor to 
achieve this aim. Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, and Weir (2003) 
developed a framework to represent people’s general humor tendencies 
or styles, one of which—aggressive humor—includes teasing, ridicule, 
and sarcasm. Although it may be rare to observe a blatantly aggressive 
joke at work (e.g., racist or sexual humor; Romeo & Cruthirds, 2006), 
employees use milder forms of aggressive humor such as sarcasm much 
more often, typically to convey disapproving information (Yam et al., 
2018). To illustrate, if one colleague says to the other, “Working hard or 
hardly working?”, they sarcastically insinuate that the person is not 
exerting enough effort. Similar examples are regularly used to directly 
mock supervisors (e.g., “Come on I’m timing you” to imply that a 
passing supervisor is not moving fast enough; Korczynski, 2011, p. 
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1434). Aggressive forms of humor such as this convey disapproval and 
resistance, but in a clever and humorous manner (Huang et al., 2015). In 
this way, the violation of openly conveying disapproval and resistance 
towards a superior becomes more acceptable (McGraw & Warren, 2010) 
and thus, a more effective communication and potential strategy to in-
crease leaders’ perceived accountability. 
Accountability enhances leaders’ self-censure by anticipating others’ 
potential objections to their decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 
Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Indeed, believing that one might have to 
justify their decisions to others causes people to act more vigilantly 
(Tetlock, 1985), increasing accuracy and more careful decision-making 
(Ford & Weldon, 1981; Rozelle & Baxter, 1981). Critically, when 
someone engages in sarcasm or teasing communication about people or 
problems at work, their colleagues may interpret it as an act of 
accountability, expecting them to speak up about other people or 
problems at work (Eliezer & Major, 2011; Mettee, Hrelec, & Wilkens, 
1971). Because these acts are taken as evidence of an underlying trait, 
they inform personality attributions (see Cooper, 2008), meaning that 
leaders will anticipate more objections in the future (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999; Tetlock et al., 1989). Central to my theorizing, leaders may then 
compensate for anticipated future objections with extra accuracy and 
vigilance (Ford & Weldon, 1981; Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; Tetlock, 
1985). In this way, follower sarcasm may trigger a sense of increased 
perceived accountability in leaders, particularly for leaders with weak 
moral identity who show more self-interested behaviors (DeCelles et al., 
2012) and are also more receptive to social norm violations (Yam et al., 
2018), which may include upward sarcasm. 
But using sarcasm is not the only means through which to affect 
leaders’ accountability. If others observe an act of follower criticism or 
sarcasm, for example, it may similarly increase leaders’ accountability 
by more widely sharing information about the leader, their perfor-
mance, and/or follower concerns about the leader or the leader’s per-
formance (Zajonc & Sales, 1966). Because simply anticipating having to 
share information in the future influences leader behavior by increasing 
accountability (Klimoski & Inks, 1990; Tetlock, 1985), actually sharing 
information with more people by having witnesses may similarly in-
fluence leader behavior via accountability. To illustrate, both of the 
previously mentioned examples of follower sarcasm also clearly 
demonstrated that at least one observer was present—the sarcasm 
expresser (Korczynski, 2011)—further underlining the important role of 
direct witnesses as accountability triggers. Thus, the accountability of 
having others present or knowledgeable of an event may also enhance 
leaders’ self-censure and more careful decision-making, thereby also 
counteracting the self-interested inclinations induced by high power 
(DeCelles et al., 2012; Keltner et al., 2003; Rus et al., 2012). Taken 
together, I formally propose: 
Hypotheses 2a-d. (A) Follower sarcasm (vs. no humor) reduces leader 
overpay (b) particularly for leaders with weak (vs. strong) moral identity 
and (c) in the presence of others (vs. private), (d) because it increases 
leaders’ accountability. 
Finally, sarcasm likely increases leaders’ accountability concerns 
more than other forms of humor. For example, positive, affiliative 
humor is often touted as the “least risky” form of humor, consistently 
predicting more positive effects on organizationally-relevant outcomes 
than other forms of humor (e.g., other-disparaging humor; Pundt & 
Herrmann, 2015; Romero & Arendt, 2011; see Mesmer-Magnus, Glew, & 
Viswesvaran, 2012, for a review). However, these positive forms of 
humor convey warmth (Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2019), thereby creating a 
sense of trust and psychological safety (Romero & Pescosolido, 2008) 
rather than accountability. Hence, although both forms of humor 
comprise plausible deniability—an essential criterion to successfully 
communicate up the hierarchy (see Tynan, 2005)—sarcasm is more 
aggressive in its content and tone, more clearly triggering a sense of 
accountability. Thus, to further demarcate the role of sarcastic humor 
versus humor more generally, I also test a non-sarcastic joke as a 
comparison (i.e., affiliative humor; Martin et al., 2003) and predict 
stronger effects of follower sarcasm: 
Hypothesis 3. Follower sarcasm reduces leader overpay more than 
follower affiliative humor. 
1.3. Overview of studies 
Taken together, I propose that leaders engage in overpay when they 
have the power and discretion to do so, especially less moral leaders, but 
that follower sarcasm—particularly when it is enacted in the presence of 
others—reduces leaders’ overpay because it makes leaders feel more 
accountable. 
To test these hypotheses, I conduct three behavioral experiments and 
a field study. In Study 1, I aim to show first evidence for the idea that 
leaders engage in overpay, but that follower sarcasm reduces this 
overpay. Then, in Study 2, I aim to replicate and extend findings from 
Study 1 by comparing sarcasm to non-sarcastic humor and including a 
second sarcastic joke to increase generalizability. Moreover, I also test 
the moderating role of leader moral identity in Study 2, because the 
effect of leaders’ increased power on their self-interested behaviors may 
be driven by leaders with weak moral identity. In Study 3, I manipulate 
the mediator (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) to show explicit evidence 
of the theorized mechanism: leader accountability. Finally, in Study 4, I 
test the accountability mechanism again in a field study with real leader- 
follower pairs. 
As a more technical note, Studies 1–3 received ethics committee 
approval (EK 2019-N-144) but Study 4 was exempt from formal review 
because it did not include deception. Sample sizes were pre-determined 
before data collections commenced. I report all measures, manipula-
tions, and exclusions. I consider p < .05 statistically significant and have 
made the data available.2 
2. Study 1 method 
2.1. Sample and procedure 
I recruited 250 employed American adults via Prolific Academic, a 
web-based survey platform with a reputation for high-quality data 
(Gloor, Gazdag, & Reinwald, 2020; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & 
Acquisti, 2017); 6 did not finish. A further 4 were excluded for self- 
reported dishonest responses (see Vesteinsdottir et al., 2019). The 
remaining 240 participants (96% completion rate) identified as women 
(42.5%) or men (57.5%). Participants reported being an average age of 
37.85 (SD = 11.70) years with 19.53 (SD = 13.91) years of work 
experience. Participants identified as White/Caucasian (84.4%), Black/ 
African American (6.7%), Latinx (6.3%), Asian American/Pacific 
Islander (5.8%), Native American (2.5%), and mixed/other (0.4%); 
multiple selections were possible. 
The study was framed as a test of “leadership and cognitive ability.” 
It was a 2-condition, between-subjects experiment. I manipulated fol-
lower sarcasm (vs. a non-humorous control) to examine its effect on 
leaders’ pay recommendations. Participants began the study by 
answering a few questions such as dominance motivation (Cassidy & 
Lynn, 1989), leadership experience, and number of direct reports, 
ostensibly to inform leader selection for the subsequent task; this is 
consistent with recent procedures to examine leadership and power (e. 
g., Maner & Mead, 2010). Participants were told that they would be 
2 See here https://osf.io/t8c2b/ on the Open Science Framework. 
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completing a task alongside two others, whom they would see in a vir-
tual chatroom. The chatroom simulated a real interaction between the 
participant and two other players (see Fig. 1).3 
Participants were always assigned to the higher power role (i.e., the 
leader and humor responder), while the two other (fictional) partici-
pants were always in the lower power roles (i.e., the humor appreciator 
and the humor user for chatroom Players 1 and 2, the ostensible other 
people in the chatroom, respectively). However, participants were told 
that the leader assignment could be changed in Round 2, based on ev-
eryone’s performance in Round 1. 
The participant received the details of the task, a version of the 
Remote Associates Task (i.e., the RAT; Mednick, 1968), wherein par-
ticipants must select one word that tied together a set of three words. For 
example, if given “white,” “scramble,” and “shell,” the fourth word to tie 
them all together would be “egg.” Participants were instructed that their 
goal was to complete as many word associations as possible from the set 
of 15 within 1-min. 
In the chatroom running alongside the RAT, the leader joined to see 
brief messages from Players 1 and 2. If assigned to the sarcasm condi-
tion, after about 45 s, Player 2 made a sarcastic joke towards the leader 
through the chat function (e.g., “hey, what does it take to be a leader 
around here? apparently, it takes a lot of time ;-) ”). The humor user used 
a winking emoji, while Player 1 also wrote “Haha,” to further emphasize 
the humor attempt, its appropriateness, and its success as a funny joke. If 
assigned to the no humor condition, Player 2 wrote, “time is running out. 
you almost finished, leader?” after which Player 1 wrote “15 s.” Thus, in 
both cases, the upward communication was initiated by Player 2 and 
reinforced by Player 1. 
Shortly afterwards, participants were notified that the chat had 
“timed out” and their screens automatically advanced. After this, par-
ticipants were given a short explanation that Round 2 would not be 
played after all due to time constraints, debriefed about the true purpose 
and design of the study, and then redirected back to the Prolific 
Academic survey platform. 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. Leader performance 
Leaders’ performance was objectively measured as the number of 
correct responses they provided in the RAT task described above 
(Mednick, 1968); range 0–15. 
2.2.2. Pay recommendations 
Leaders’ pay recommendations were measured with three single 
items indicating leaders’ pay recommendations for Player 1, Player 2,4 
as well as themselves. After the following instructions, “Participants 
receive .10/correct response. Please indicate how much you would pay 
each participant, relative to their earnings. As the leader of this task, we 
may take your opinion into account when making the final payments.” 
Participants reported their responses on three separate sliding scales 
from − 100 to 100, one for each of the referents. Participants were 
additionally informed the following for clarification: “For example, 
0 would mean a 0% change, and the participant would receive what they 
earned.” To be clear: due to the scale and scoring, all positive values 
indicate pay in excess of performance-based earnings. 
2.2.3. Perceived humorousness 
At the end of the survey, I asked participants about Player 2’s 
communication. Amongst other, unrelated filler items to reduce partici-
pant suspicion and demand effects, I included 3 items to assess perceived 
humorousness (e.g., humorous, funny, entertaining) from 1 (“not at all”) 
to 7 (“extremely”; Bitterly, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2017; α = 0.92), with 
Fig. 1. Chatroom simulation.  
3 This manipulation–and deception–was essential because the design 
required experimental control and the phenomenon of interest is social. For a 
similar chat room set-up to facilitate experimental realism, see Reh, Troester, 
and Van Quaquebeke (2017). For a similar ostensible team set-up to facilitate 
experimental and mundane realism, see Reich and Hershcovis (2014). 
4 Although I predict an effect of follower sarcasm on leaders’ pay recom-
mendations for themselves, I do not predict an effect of follower sarcasm on 
their pay recommendations for Player 1 or Player 2 (i.e., the two followers). 
Indeed, a common response to experiencing high power is an increased self- 
focus (e.g., de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; 
See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; see Williams, 2014, for a review). 
Although negative reactions towards others is possible (e.g., punishment; 
Maner & Mead, 2010; Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003), particularly in 
response to power threats (which could include sarcasm and critical follower 
communication), the focus of the current research is on the former. 
J.L.P. Gloor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 96 (2021) 104166
5
the addition of a fourth item to assess perceived sarcasm (α = 0.87). 
2.2.4. Control variables 
Morality (see Jaffee & Hyde, 2000, for a review), as well as financial 
behavior (Gupta, Mortal, Chakrabarty, Guo, & Turban, 2020), may 
significantly differ by participant gender. Thus, I included participant 
gender as a covariate (0 = male, 1 = female). Although the gender of the 
person expressing the humor or sarcasm may also alter its interpretation 
(Gloor et al., 2021; Katz, Blasko, & Kazmerski, 2004), the sarcasm 
expresser (Player 2) as well as the sarcasm recipient (Player 1) were both 
expressly designed to be gender neutral in the current research paradigm. 
Results for this and the sub-sequent analyses remain largely unchanged in 
size/significance when calculated without gender; participant gender 
also did not significantly moderate these results (b = 3.91, SE = 11.11, p 
= .725). 
2.2.5. Other variables 
Consistent with recent practices (e.g., see Schmid, 2020), to further 
reinforce the cover story, I asked additional items typical of a leader and 
person higher in the hierarchy with power to control resources, rewards 
and/or penalize the followers, including perceived performance ratings, 
willingness to play again (and if so, with whom), and two scales 
assessing how much power they felt (i.e., “As the leader, how powerful 
did you feel?,” from (1) “completely powerless” to (7) “completely 
powerful” and an 8-item measure of generalized sense of power, e.g., “If 
I wanted to, I got to make the decisions,” measured from (1) “disagree 
strongly” to (7) “agree strongly” (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012, α =
0.83). Results revealed no difference in the power leaders felt according 
to the experimental condition on the single item (Mhumor = 3.02, SD =
1.66, Mcontrol = 3.18, SD = 1.57; b = − 0.13, SE = 0.21, p = .535) nor the 
8-item generalized sense of power scale (Mhumor = 3.89, SD = 0.96, 
Mcontrol = 3.88, SD = 1.02; b = 0.002, SE = 0.13, p = .988), indicating the 
power manipulation worked similarly across conditions. Given the focus 
of this research on leaders’ tangible, self-interested behavior (i.e., 
overpay), I do not analyze these items nor do I report further results 
related to these here. 
3. Study 1 results 
I use Generalized Structural Equation Modeling (GSEM) to estimate 
path models, first a combined model with all 3 pay recommendations 
(including their covariances), then a robustness check controlling for 
leader performance. Although single-item measures are typically not 
ideal in psychology research, they are common and acceptable in 
judgment and decision-making research (e.g., Bergkvist & Rossiter, 
2007); guidelines for the use of single-item measures in decision- 
making research proposed by Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, Wilc-
zynski, and Kaiser (2012) also verify its appropriateness here. SEM and 
GSEM offer empirical advantages over more commonly used methods 
(e.g., ANOVA; see Bagozzi & Yi, 1989; Breitsohl, 2018), such as greater 
flexibility, the ability to simultaneously analyze multiple dependent 
variables, and clustering SEs (which becomes relevant in Studies 2–4 to 
account for nested data). A simple explanation for less familiar readers 
is that ordinary least squares regression is simply a limited or special 
case of SEM and GSEM is a special case of SEM (i.e., in GSEM but not in 
SEM, I can use factor notation for binary variables and their in-
teractions). See Table 1 for descriptives and correlations. 
Participants rated the sarcasm condition (M = 3.29, SD = 1.36) as 
more humorous than the control condition (M = 2.98, SD = 1.32), b =
0.31, SE = 0.17, p = .071. Although this effect only approaches signif-
icance, it is consistent with the idea that jokes are often deemed less 
funny if they are initiated by a lower status humor user (e.g., see 
Lundberg, 1969). 
Leaders recommended that they should be paid an additional 17.22 
pence (SD = 43.38) above their performance-based pay, showing evidence 
of overpay, supporting Hypothesis 1a. However, as predicted, follower 
sarcasm decreased leaders’ self-pay recommendations (b = − 13.71, SE =
5.49, p = .013, Cohen’s d = − 0.335; see Table 2, Fig. 2), supporting Hy-
pothesis 2a. 
In contrast, there was no effect of follower sarcasm on leaders’ pay 
recommendations for Players 1 or 2 (bs = 3.59–3.78, SEs = 4.74–4.77, 
ps = 0.428–0.448)—nor was one predicted. As a reminder, a null effect 
here is consistent with the idea of performance-based pay, such that 
each player or the leader earns 0.10/correct response. These results 
support the idea that leaders pay themselves less in response to follower 
sarcasm (vs. no humor), but they do not punish the sarcastic follower nor 
the follower who laughed, at least in terms of pay. 
As robustness checks, analyses show that follower sarcasm did not 
significantly relate to leaders’ objective performance on the RAT task (b 
= − 0.30, SE = 0.41, p = .457), nor did including leaders’ performance as 
a covariate eliminate the previously reported significant effect of fol-
lower sarcasm on leaders’ self-pay recommendations (b = − 14.15, SE =
5.40, p = .009). 
4. Study 2 method 
Study 1 showed initial support for the core idea of this research: 
sarcasm reduces leaders’ self-interested behavior (i.e., overpay). In 
Study 2, I aim to extend these results by testing the role of leader moral 
identity and including a new joke that does not explicitly address the 
leader to more closely examine the effect of sarcasm (vs. non-sarcastic 
humor). I also add a new sarcastic joke to increase generalizability (i. 
e., to show that the effect is about sarcasm more broadly rather than an 
artefact of the particular joke). Finally, I doubled the sample size to 
increase the power to detect the interaction effect of leader moral 
identity and follower sarcasm. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (Study 1).  
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Follower 
sarcasm 
0.51 0.50 –     
2. Player 1 pay 24.50 36.60 0.04 –    
3. Player 2 pay 24.37 36.87 0.04 0.95*** –   
4. Leader self 
pay 
17.22 43.48 − 0.17** 0.20** 0.25*** –  
5. Leader gender 0.43 0.50 − 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.15* – 
Note. Coding: control/no humor (0), sarcasm (1); participant gender: 0 (man), 1 
(woman). N = 240. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Table 2 
GSEM results (Study 1).  
Variable Player 1 Pay Player 2 Pay Self Pay 
b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Constant 21.12(4.06)*** 20.60(4.08)*** 19.17(4.70)*** 
Follower sarcasm 3.59(4.74) 3.78(4.77) − 13.71(5.49)* 
Participant gender 3.90(4.79) 4.60(4.83) 11.95(5.55)*  
Pseudo loglikelihood − 3369.08 
AIC 6768.17 
BIC 6820.38 
Note. Coding: control/no humor (0), sarcasm (1); participant gender: 0 (man), 1 
(woman). 
N = 240. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
5 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 240, and 1 covariate 
revealed 0.75 power (G*Power, version 3.1.9.7; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007, 2009). 
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4.1. Sample and procedure 
The sample, design, and procedure mimicked Study 1, with two ex-
ceptions. First, I manipulated follower sarcasm with a new leader- 
directed joke to better ensure the elicited effects are due to sarcasm 
rather than an artifact of the specific joke. This joke was constructed as a 
sarcastic pun as in Study 1 but still with helpful task-related information 
as in Study 1 (“in a rut or a hole, leader? (like the answer to the last one) 
;-)”);. I also included a similarly constructed joke with an analogous 
humor tone but without explicitly referencing the leader (which scholars 
argue is a key criterion of sarcasm; e.g., Lee & Katz, 1998), as more 
affiliative, non-sarcastic joke (“since you’re probably flaking out or 
daydreaming after #7-8, go for ‘gold’ in #9 ;-)”). These jokes also pro-
vide information to complete the task; “hole,” “flake,” “day dream,” and 
“gold” were all task answers. Second, I took 3 quality measures due to 
the COVID-19 crisis which occurred after Study 1 data collections and 
was ongoing during this data collection.6 
This was a 4-condition, between-subjects experiment. I manipulated 
follower humor/sarcasm and measured participants’ moral identity to 
examine their main and interactive effects on leaders’ self-pay. Although 
I aimed to recruit 500 employed American adults, an extra 37 partici-
pated due to a technical error; Prolific could not explain this nor did they 
charge me for them. Analyses are reported for N = 526 due to 2 outlier 
exclusions (as determined by having leverage and cooks scores above 
0.019 and 0.008, respectively), and 9 due to dishonest responses (see 
Vesteinsdottir et al., 2019). Of these 526, participants identified as 
59.4% male and 40.6% female. Participants reported being an average 
age of 32.95 years (SD = 8.29) with an average of 13.79 (SD = 10.97) 
years of work experience. Participants identified as White/Caucasian 
(79.7%), Black/African American (8.3%), Latinx (5.0%), Asian Amer-
ican/Pacific Islander (10.8%), Native American (1.5%), or other (1.5%); 
multiple selections were possible. 
4.2. Measures 
I measured leader performance, self-pay recommendations,7 a 
sarcasm manipulation check, and participant gender as in Study 1. 
4.2.1. Leader moral identity 
Participants completed a validated measure of the internalization 
dimension of the moral identity scale (5-items; Aquino & Reed, 2002) to 
assess the extent to which being “moral” is a self-defining, central aspect 
of one’s self-concept. Although I included this measure at the end of the 
survey, it assesses the extent to which moral content is chronically 
assessable (see Aquino et al., 2009), and therefore, should be relatively 
stable. Indeed, of the two facets of moral identity: internalization and 
symbolization (Aquino & Reed, 2002), the former is a more reliable 
predictor of behavior across a range of behaviors (see Mayer, Aquino, 
Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012). 
As in Yam et al. (2019), participants read: “Listed below are some 
characteristics that may describe a person: caring, compassionate, fair, 
honest, helpful, friendly, generous, kind, and hardworking. The person 
with these characteristics could be you or someone else. For a moment, 
visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. 
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a 
clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following 
questions.” Then, participants rated the following 5 items: “It would 
make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics,” “I 
would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics” 
(reverse-coded), “I strongly desire to have these characteristics,” “being 
someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am,” 
and “Having these characteristics is not really important to me” 
(reverse-coded), from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5) (α 
= 0.72). I then standardized it for ease of interpretation. 
5. Study 2 results 
For descriptives and correlations, see Table 3. Data are analyzed and 
reported as in Study 1 (see Table 4). Because there were no differences in 
participants’ ratings of the two sarcastic jokes (b = 0.11, SE = 0.15, p =
.478), and participants rated the sarcastic jokes (Mtime = 3.60, SDtime =
1.68 and Mhole = 3.14, SDhole = 1.58) as more sarcastic than the affili-
ative joke (M = 2.92, SD = 1.58) and the control (M = 2.71, SD = 1.66), I 
collapsed the data across sarcastic jokes. While the affiliative joke did 
not differ from the control condition in sarcasm ratings (b = 0.20, SE =
0.20, p = .314), the sarcastic jokes were rated as more sarcastic than the 




















































No Follower Sarcasm Follower Sarcasm
Fig. 2. Effects of follower sarcasm on leaders’ pay recommendations (Study 1). 
Note. Player 2 enacted the sarcasm and Player 1 laughed at it. Bars represent 95% CIs. N = 240. 
6 I took three precautions to preserve data quality and consistency despite the 
COVID-19 crisis. First, I added a new worker criterion such that participants 
must have been employed before and after the crisis to control some of the 
financial or job insecurity which may cloud results related to the key outcome 
of interest: leaders’ self-pay. Second, I added two questions at the end of the 
survey to assess participants’ COVID-19 crisis-related perceptions, including 
how much they have been affected by it (from 1 “not at all” - 5 “extremely”), as 
well as if it might have influenced their answers to this study (no/perhaps a 
little/yes very much). Although the first item was uncorrelated with leader self- 
pay and moral identity (rs(526) = − 0.02–0.07, ps = 0.119–0.670), the second 
item was correlated with moral identity (r(526) = − 0.22, p < .001), but not 
self-pay (r(526) = 0.04, p = .303). Because of this, and because 113 participants 
reported “perhaps a little” and 12 reported “yes, very much so,” I included the 
second item in the model to cluster the SEs (in line with recent recommenda-
tions by McNeish & Stapleton, 2016; McNeish et al., 2017). 
7 Because I no longer analyze follower pay, I hereafter refer to this more 
simply as “pay.” 
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sarcasm manipulation was successful. 
Leaders recommended that they should be paid an additional 16.40 
pence (SD = 42.55). This shows evidence of overpay, replicating Study 1 
and further supporting Hypothesis 1a. 
As predicted, follower sarcasm reduced leader pay (b = − 2.11, 
SErobust = 0.75, p = .005, d = − 0.258; see Table 4). In contrast, there was 
no effect of non-sarcastic, affiliative follower humor on leader pay (b =
− 4.52, SErobust = 5.75, p = .431, d = − 0.07).9 These results replicate 
Study 1, showing further support for Hypothesis 2a, while showing some 
evidence of the divergent effects of follower sarcasm and humor, 
partially supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Leader moral identity did not influence leader pay (b = − 1.84, 
SErobust = 2.03, p = .363), showing a lack of support for Hypothesis 1b. 
However, as predicted, these effects were qualified by an interaction 
with follower sarcasm (b = 10.20, SErobust= 2.65, p < .001, d = 0.26),10 
such that the effect of follower sarcasm on leader pay was larger for 
leaders with weak moral identity (simple slope at moral identity -1SD: b 
= − 13.24, SErobust = 4.33, p < .001) than for leaders with strong moral 
identity (simple slope at moral identity +1SD: b = 7.16, SErobust = 2.56, 
p = .005; see Fig. 3), supporting Hypothesis 2b. The interaction of 
sarcasm and moral identity significantly differed from the effects of 
follower affiliative humor and moral identity (χ2(1, N = 526) = 17.07, p 
< .001) and the effect of the control and moral identity (χ2(1, N = 526) 
= 14.78, p < .001), although the latter two effects did not differ from 
each other (χ2(1, N = 526) = 0.32, p = .573). 
Robustness checks show that including leaders’ RAT performance as 
a covariate in the models did not alter the previously reported interac-
tion of follower sarcasm and leader moral identity (b = 10.23, SE = 2.87, 
p < .001) while the interaction between follower humor and leader 
moral identity also remained non-significant (b = 1.89, SE = 2.26, p =
.404). 
6. Study 3 
As predicted, results from Studies 1–2 have generally supported my 
hypotheses. Thus, in Study 3, I aim to replicate and extend these find-
ings by showing more explicit evidence of the theorized mechanism: 
accountability. In doing so, I complement the pair of studies thus far 
with a manipulated mediator design (see Spencer et al., 2005) and a 
pre-registered study.11 
6.1. Sample and procedure 
The sample, design, and procedure mimicked Study 2, except that I 
also manipulated leader accountability. I randomly assigned leaders to 1 
of 3 accountability conditions: yes/accountability (“your performance 
and decisions related to the task will be shared with the other players 
between Rounds 1 and 2”), no accountability (“your performance and 
decisions related to the task will not be shared with the other players 
between Rounds 1 and 2”), and a control condition with no information 
about accountability. Thus, this was a 6-condition, between-subjects 
experiment, wherein I manipulated follower sarcasm (yes/no) and 
leader accountability (yes/no/control) to measure their main and 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (Study 2)  
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Follower 
sarcasm 




0.25 0.43 − 0.57*** –    
3. Leader moral 
identity 
4.58 1.27 0.10 − 0.03 –   
4. Leader self-pay 16.49 42.55 − 0.00 − 0.03 − 0.04 –  
5. Leader gender 0.41 0.49 0.05 − 0.01 0.15 0.02 – 
Note. Coding: Sarcasm and affiliative humor are each coded (1) compared with 
the control/no humor condition (0); follower gender: 0 (man), 1 (woman). 
Although the analyses are calculated with standardized moral identity (M =
0.00, SD = 1.00), I report the M and SD of the original measure here. N = 526. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Table 4 
GSEM results (Study 2).  


















Follower humor − 4.52(5.75) − 4.71(6.01) − 5.31(6.42) 
Leader moral identity – − 1.84(2.03) − 7.73 
(3.49)* 
Follower sarcasm × leader moral 
identity 
– – 10.20 
(2.65)*** 
Follower humor × leader moral 
identity 
– – 1.28(2.28) 
Leader gender 1.52(4.97) 2.10(5.24) 1.98(4.73) 
Pseudo loglikelihood − 2718.23 − 2717.74 2714.39 
AIC 5440.46 5439.49 5432.78 
BIC 5448.99 5448.02 5441.31 
Note. Follower sarcasm and follower humor are compared to the control/non- 
humorous condition. Leader moral identity is standardized. N = 526. 















-3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Leader Moral Identity (Standardized)
Control/No Humor Follower Sarcasm
Follower Affiliative Humor
Fig. 3. Effects of follower sarcasm, follower humor, and leader moral identity 
on leader pay recommendations (Study 2). 
Note. All pay values above 0 signifies overpay. Bands denote 95% CIs. N = 526. 
8 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 526, and 1 covariate 
revealed 0.85 power.  
9 A power sensitivity analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 526, 1 covariate, and 0.80 
power revealed critical d = 0.24.  
10 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 526, and 1 covariate 
revealed 0.80 power. 
11 The preregistration is accessible here; the data and stimuli are provided 
here. 
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interactive effects on leaders’ self-pay recommendations. 
Although 54012 employed American adults were recruited, 534 
finished with complete data. Analyses are reported for N = 524 due to 2 
outlier exclusions (1 in the sarcasm and 1 in the control condition, both 
in the accountability condition, due to high leverage and cooks scores), 5 
due to dishonest responses (3 in the sarcasm, 2 in the control condition, 
all 5 in the no accountability condition; see Vesteinsdottir et al., 2019), 
and 3 for missing data on gender. 
Participants identified as male (56.1%) or female (43.9%). Partici-
pants reported being 35.6 years of age (SD = 9.15) with 15.03 years (SD 
= 10.67) of work experience. Participants identified as White/Caucasian 
(83.9%), Black/African American (9.7%), Latinx (2.3%), Asian Amer-
ican/Pacific Islander (6.6%), Native American (0.7%), and mixed/other 
(0.7%). 
6.2. Measures 
I measured leader pay, moral identity, a sarcasm manipulation check 
(α = 0.86), and participant gender as in Studies 1–2. I also manipulated 
leader accountability (control/yes/no). 
6.2.1. Leader accountability 
At the end of the survey, I asked participants 4 items adapted from 
Rus et al. (2012): “In answering the previous questions, did you feel… 
you would have to explain why you did certain things?”, “you would be 
held accountable for your actions?”, “Player 1 may scrutinize your re-
sponses/decisions?”, and “Player 2 may scrutinize your responses/de-
cisions?” These items were rated from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) 
“strongly agree” (α = 0.88). Participants reported more accountability in 
the accountability (vs. control) condition (χ2(1) = 9.95, p = .002); thus, 
the high accountability manipulation was successful. The low account-
ability (vs. control) conditions did not differ from each other (χ2(1) =
1.10, p = .295). 
6.2.2. Control variables and alternative models 
As in Study 2 and in the pre-registration, I tested the two COVID-19 
items from Study 2 as covariates and as SE clustering variables. As in 
Study 2, the first item was uncorrelated with leader moral identity and 
pay (rs(524) = − 0.00–0.01, ps = 0.767–0.999), the second item was 
correlated with both leader moral identity and pay (rs(524) =
− 0.29–0.14, ps ≤ 0.001). Because of this, and because 84 participants 
reported “perhaps a little” and 16 reported “yes, very much so,” I 
included the second item in the model to cluster the SEs (in line with 
recent recommendations by McNeish & Stapleton, 2016; McNeish, Sta-
pleton, & Silverman, 2017; and as in Study 2). Because clustering the 
data by this second COVID-19 item also yielded similar results as the 
model clustering the data by wave (as reported below) (i.e., the 3-way 
interaction of follower sarcasm, leader moral identity, and account-
ability remained significant, b = − 4.96, SE = 1.42, p < .001, but the 3- 
way interaction with no accountability became non-significant, b =
− 12.75, SErobust = 6.54, p = .051), this suggests the results are rather 
robust to these choices. 
6.3. Study 3 results 
For descriptives and correlations, see Table 5. Participants rated the 
sarcastic conditions as more humorous (M = 3.23, SD = 1.33; b = 0.15, 
SE = 0.06, p = .014) and as more sarcastic (M = 3.09, SD = 1.68; b =
0.17, SE = 0.06, p = .003) than the control condition (M = 2.86, SD =
1.43; M = 2.64, SD = 1.51, respectively), indicating the follower 
sarcasm manipulation was successful. 
Leaders engaged in overpay (M = 24.49, SD = 40.16), replicating 
Studies 1–2 and showing further support for Hypothesis 1a. However, 
follower sarcasm surprisingly increased leader self-pay (vs. control; b =
4.23, SErobust = 0.20, p < .001), showing a lack of support for Hypothesis 
2a. A 2-way interaction between follower sarcasm and leader moral 
identity (b = 2.49, SErobust = 1.00, p = .013) revealed that while the 
effect of follower sarcasm on leader self-pay decreased self-pay for 
leaders with weak moral identity as predicted, although not significantly 
so (simple slope at moral identity -3SD: b = − 3.07, SErobust = 2.60, p =
.237), it surprisingly increased self-pay for leaders with strong moral 
identity (simple slope at moral identity +1SD: b = 6.87, SErobust = 1.41, 
p < .001). These results echo the results from Study 2 at weak leader 
moral identity, failing to show full support for Hypothesis 2b. 
Having no accountability (b = 0.42, SErobust = 3.19, p = .895) or 
accountability (b = 1.77, SErobust = 2.46, p = .472) did not affect leader 
pay compared to the control condition (see Table 6). However, these 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction of accountability and 
sarcasm (b = − 17.22, SErobust = 0.61, p < .001), such that follower 
sarcasm increased leader pay in the control condition (simple slope: b =
10.13, SErobust = 0.41, p < .001) and without accountability (simple 
slope: b = 9.61, SErobust = 1.11, p < .001), but decreased leader pay in the 
accountability condition (simple slope: b = − 7.09, SErobust = 0.21, p <
.001), supporting Hypothesis 2d (Fig. 4). 
Results further revealed an interaction between follower sarcasm, 
leader accountability, and leader moral identity for the no account-
ability condition (vs. the control; b = − 12.75, SErobust = 1.46, p < .001) 
and for the accountability condition (vs. the control; b = − 4.96, SErobust 
= 1.46, p = .001). Echoing the results from Studies 1 and 2, follower 
sarcasm reduced pay for leaders with weak moral identity when they 
were accountable (simple slope: b = − 14.97, SErobust = 1.14, p < .001), 
supporting Hypothesis 2d; results revealed a similar, albeit smaller effect 
in the control accountability condition (simple slope: b = − 11.68, 
SErobust = 2.89, p < .001). In contrast, follower sarcasm increased pay for 
leaders with weak moral identity with no accountability (simple slope: b 
= 25.10, SErobust = 6.30, p < .001), a competing effect that explains why 
the previously reported effect of follower sarcasm at low moral identity 
was not significant (see Fig. 5). 
As robustness checks, while leaders’ RAT performance significantly 
predicted pay (b = − 0.43, SErobust = 0.16, p = .008), including it as a 
covariate did not alter the conclusions drawn from the previously re-
ported interaction effects of follower sarcasm and accountability on 
Table 5 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (Study 3).  
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Follower sarcasm 
(vs. control) 
0.67 0.47 –     
2. Leader ACC (vs. 
control) 
0.33 0.47 − 0.02 –    
3. Leader moral 
identity 
4.40 0.63 0.03 − 0.03 –   
4. Leader self pay 24.49 40.16 0.05 0.02 − 0.04 –  
5. Participant gender 0.44 0.50 − 0.01 − 0.01 0.11* 0.01 – 
Note. Coding: Sarcasm and accountability (ACC) are each coded (1) compared 
with the control (0); participant gender: 0 (man), 1 (woman). Although the 
analyses are calculated with standardized moral identity (M = 0.00, SD = 1.00), 
I report the M and SD of the original measure here. N = 524. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
12 Although I planned to collect data from 500 participants, after collecting 
data from 39 participants, I received a notification from Prolific that the 
average payment was too low because participants required more time to 
complete the study than expected. Thus, I paused the study, awarded these 
participants a .15GBP bonus each, and then relaunched the study to collect data 
from 500 participants with this higher pay rate. Because this affected the 
randomization and incentives, I conservatively used this data collection wave 
variable (i.e., pilot/0 main study/1) as a SE clustering variable rather than 
excluding a large share of the sample. 
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leader pay (b = − 17.12, SErobust = 0.44, p < .001), nor the 3-way in-
teractions of follower sarcasm and leader moral identity with no 
accountability (b = − 11.49, SErobust = 1.87, p < .001) or follower 
sarcasm and leader moral identity with accountability (b = − 3.85, 
SErobust = 0.22, p < .001). 
7. Study 3 discussion 
Although I predicted in the pre-registration that follower sarcasm 
might reduce leader pay the most when leader accountability was low, 
reasoning that it would replace the missing accountability, these results 
showed the opposite effect. Specifically, follower sarcasm (vs. the con-
trol) was the most effective in reducing leader overpay when leader 
accountability was high. 
The positive effect of follower sarcasm on leader self-pay was also 
unexpected—and seemingly conflicting with Studies 1–2 and the pre-
registration—but the subsequently reported interaction with leader 
accountability showed that this effect was driven by the control and no 
accountability conditions. To better understand these findings, I 
reviewed responses to a debriefing item included at the end of the sur-
vey, which showed that many participants did not believe that they were 
interacting with two other people, especially in the control and no 
accountability conditions. This means that even in the control condition 
in Study 3—the condition that best aligns with the designs in Studies 
1–2—many participants did not necessarily believe that the other 
“players” might question their pay allocation choices nor that a follower 
could become their leader in a second round. This effectively made the 
control like the no accountability condition, which would also explain 
why these two conditions did not differ in perceived accountability 
(χ2(1, N = 524) = 1.59, p = .208). Thus, I now conduct one more study 
with real leader-follower dyads to better assess the role of perceived 
leader accountability. 
8. Study 4 
Across 3 studies, results have shown causal evidence that follower 
sarcasm reduces leader overpay, particularly when leaders have low 
moral identity and are accountable. However, the design in Studies 1–3 
was somewhat artificial and included deception (i.e., leaders were not 
actually interacting with 2 other real people), and many participants in 
Study 3 did not believe they were interacting with two others, particu-
larly undermining the control condition. Thus, to better test the effects 
of follower sarcasm on leaders’ perceived accountability and ideally 
show evidence of the effect’s generalizability, I aim to extend this idea 
by testing real leaders and their followers. In doing so, I can also 
explicitly test the effects of the presence of other people (vs. a private 
event) and more (vs. less) follower sarcasm on leaders’ perceived 
accountability. 
9. Study 4 methods 
9.1. Sample and procedure 
To examine leaders’ real interactions with their followers, I con-
ducted an experimental recall task (adapted from Bitterly et al., 2017). 
Leaders were randomly assigned to 1 of 2 conditions to recall an act of 
follower sarcasm (i.e., “a story or a joke that one of your followers told 
you that you thought was funny, cheeky, and/or sarcastic”) or a follower 
greeting (i.e., “a greeting that one of your followers told you that you 
thought was nice, warm, and/or friendly”). Participants were told “to 
use at least 100 characters to write about the situation with enough 
detail that someone who did not know you or the person you wrote 
about could understand the situation.” Thus, this was a 2-condition, 
between-subjects experiment, wherein I manipulated follower sarcasm 
(yes/no) and measured if others witnessed the event and leader 
accountability. 
I aimed to recruit 500 participants (decided prior to data collection) 
who were employed adults in the United Kingdom with current lead-
ership/supervisory duties; 501 finished with complete data. Participants 
identified as male (49.1%), female (50.7%), and non-binary/other 
(0.2%). Participants reported being 36.1 (SD = 9.79) years old with 
8.80 (SD = 10.96) years of work experience and an average of 8.16 (SD 
= 19.65) direct reports at work. Participants identified as White/ 
Caucasian (88.0%), Black/African (3.2%), Latinx/Hispanic (2.3%), 
Asian/Pacific Islander (6.6%), and mixed/other (2.0%); multiple selec-
tions were possible. 
Table 6 
GSEM path model results (Study 3).  























Leader no ACC 0.42(2.46) 0.40(4.41) 1.22(3.51) 
Leader moral identity – – − 10.54 
(0.67)*** 




Leader no ACC × follower 
sarcasm 
– − 0.52(1.52) − 1.47(0.97) 
Leader ACC × leader moral 
identity 
– – 11.89 
(0.50)*** 
Leader no ACC × leader moral 
identity 
– – 11.90 
(2.54)*** 
Follower sarcasm × leader moral 
identity 
– – 7.62(1.05)*** 
Leader ACC ×follower sarcasm ×
moral identity 
– – − 4.96 
(1.46)** 
Leader no ACC × follower 
sarcasm × moral identity 
– – − 12.75 
(1.46)*** 
Leader gender 0.14(1.02) 0.27(1.02) 0.82(60.96) 
Pseudo loglikelihood − 2677.40 − 2675.10 − 2671.22 
AIC 5356.80 5352.19 5344.44 
BIC 5361.06 5356.45 5348.70 
Note. ACC = Accountability; ACC and No ACC conditions are compared to the 
control condition. 
Leader Moral Identity is standardized. N = 524. 





Control No Accountability Accountability Control No Accountability Accountability








Fig. 4. Effects of follower sarcasm and leader accountability on leader pay 
recommendations (Study 3). 
Note. All pay values above 0 signifies overpay. Bands denote 95% CIs. N = 524. 
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9.2. Measures 
I included a slightly different manipulation check here to better 
differentiate between sarcasm and other forms of humor (which I 
manipulated in Study 2). Thus, I included 3 items to assess if the follower’s 
communication was sarcastic, teasing, and critical (α = 0.72). I collected 
gender as in Studies 1–3. I also included a 4-item measure of leaders’ 
perceived accountability to the follower (Rus et al., 2012; α = 0.77), 
which was a manipulation check in Study 3. 
Presence of others. I included a self-developed, 4-item measure 
assessing the private or public nature of the recalled event (e.g., “Did 
other employees hear or learn about it later?”, “Did other employees 
witness it?”, reverse-coded: “The event stayed between you and the 
employee.” and “It remained private.”). Items were rated from “No” (1) to 
“Yes” (5) (α = 0.84). For a more intuitive interpretation, I dichotomously 
transformed it via mean-split (“yes” (1), “no” (0)). 
10. Study 4 results 
For descriptives and correlations, see Table 7. Participants rated the 
sarcastic conditions as more sarcastic (M = 3.18, SD = 1.44) than the 
control condition (i.e., the greeting; M = 1.66, SD = 1.01; b = 1.52, SE =
0.11, p < .001), indicating the manipulation was successful. However, 
closer inspection of participants’ written responses showed that many 
participants recalled non-sarcastic stories or jokes for the sarcasm condi-
tion (e.g., a follower not realizing they was wearing pajamas on a Zoom 
call) and some communications that were not warm nor greetings for the 
greeting condition (e.g., a follower was sad because they recently lost a 
pet).13 
As predicted, follower sarcasm was associated with more leader 
accountability (b = 0.09, SErobust = 0.03, p = .006, d = 0.25; see 
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-3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
Control No Accountability
Accountability








Leader Moral Identity (Standardized)
Fig. 5. Effects of follower sarcasm, leader accountability, and leader moral identity on leader pay recommendations (Study 3). 
Note. All pay values above 0 signifies overpay. Bands denote 95% CIs. N = 524. 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (Study 4).  
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Sarcasm 
manipulation 
0.49 0.50 –     
2. Follower sarcasm 2.41 1.45 0.52*** –    
3. Presence of others 0.61 0.49 0.11* 0.10* –   
4. Leader 
accountability 
4.19 1.52 − 0.04 0.07 0.11* –  
5. Leader gender 0.51 0.50 0.04 − 0.05 − 0.02 − 0.07 – 
Note. Coding: Sarcasm is coded (1) compared with the control/greeting (0); 
leader and follower gender: 0 (man), 1 (woman), because there was only 1 non- 
binary participant, so these statistics could not remain anonymous. Although the 
analyses are calculated with standardized perceptions of follower sarcasm (M =
-0.00, SD = 1.00), I report the M and SD of the original measure here. N = 500. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
13 Rather than making subjective, post-hoc exclusions, I used participants’ 
self-reported sarcasm in the interaction as the main predictor rather than the 
experimental manipulation. Thus, for full transparency: this study no longer 
presents causal results, but correlational results. However, to account for par-
ticipants’ nesting within experimental conditions (see Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 
2012), I cluster the SEs by the recall manipulation (consistent with recent 
recommendations by McNeish & Stapleton, 2016; McNeish et al., 2017); multi- 
level analyses revealed nearly identical results, i.e., the interaction: b = 0.23, 
SE = 0.09, p = .017, although the linear model did not differ from the random 
effects model, χ2(1) = 1.21, p = .136.  
14 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 501, and 1 covariate 
revealed power of greater than .80. 
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associated with more leader accountability (b = 0.33, SErobust = 0.11, p =
.001, d = 0.27).15 However, as predicted, results further revealed a sig-
nificant interaction between follower sarcasm and the presence of others 
on leader accountability (b = 0.23, SErobust = 0.08, p = .003; d = 0.26),16 
such that there was a non-significant association between follower 
sarcasm and leader accountability when the event was private—only 
between the leader and the follower (simple slope: b = − 0.11, SErobust =
0.10, p = .275), but a positive association when the event was pub-
lic—when others were present or knowledgeable about the event (simple 
slope: b = 0.22, SErobust = 0.01, p < .001; see Fig. 6). These results show 
support for Hypothesis 2c. 
Robustness checks showed that the interaction effect remained 
generally unchanged in size and significance after controlling for tenure 
(i.e., how many years the leader and follower have worked together), 
single-item indicators of leader and follower performance (i.e., “In 
general, do you/your follower perform well?” from “Never (0)” to “Al-
ways (4)”), and a measure of general accountability (i.e., the original 
scale by Rus et al., 2012), b = 0.14, SErobust = 0.04, p = .001. 
11. General discussion 
Results from three behavioral experiments and a field study showed 
that leaders paid themselves more than they earned based on their 
performance (Studies 1–3), which was more prominent for leaders with 
weak moral identity (Studies 2–3), but follower sarcasm reduced it 
(Studies 1–2) when leaders were accountable to their followers (vs. 
control; Study 3) or when others witnessed the event (Study 4). These 
effects were robust to several controls, including leader performance, 
leader tenure with the follower, and how generally accountable leaders 
felt. I discuss the implications of these findings for theory and practice. 
11.1. Theoretical implications 
By testing the effects of follower sarcasm on leaders’ self-interested 
behaviors, this research extends the leadership and power literatures 
by integrating insights from the humor literature. A long line of litera-
ture has shown the power of humor for those in power (Avolio et al., 
1999; Cheng et al., 2019; Cooper & Sosik, 2012; Decker & Rotondo, 
2001; Hughes & Avey, 2009; Lundberg, 1969; Robinson & Smith-Lovin, 
2001; Vecchio et al., 2009; Yam et al., 2018; see Kong et al., 2019, for a 
review). However, this research is almost exclusively conducted in the 
typical direction of power relations (Dosier et al., 1988; Fiske, 1991, 
1992). By flipping the hierarchy, I proposed that follower sarcasm 
triggers the opposite effect and findings from three behavioral experi-
ments and a field study generally support this idea. While research has 
shown that leaders’ humor reinforces their power, this research suggests 
that followers can use sarcasm to reduce the same hierarchy. Indeed, 
findings consistently showed that a simple act of follower sarcasm 
affected leader behavior by reducing their overpay, particularly with 
less moral leaders and when leaders were accountable to others. 
In doing so, these findings also complement an emerging area of 
research on followership (e.g., Ahmad, Klotz, & Bolino, 2020; Uhl-Bien, 
Riggio, Lowe, & Carsten, 2014; van Vugt, 2006), which emphasizes 
followers as understudied yet active and influential part of the leader- 
follower dyad. That is, despite the hierarchical differences between 
leaders and followers, these results highlight an important theoretical 
insight at the intersection of role theory and humor theory: a follower 
communication—sarcastic humor—significantly affects leader behav-
iors (e.g., leaders’ pay recommendations). 
By explicitly examining the effects of follower sarcasm on leader 
behaviors, this research also contributes to the humor literature by 
testing humor’s effectiveness up the hierarchy. Existing studies have 
generally examined humor use within approximately the same hierar-
chical level (e.g., Evans et al., 2019; Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 
2014; Prusaczyk & Hodson, 2020; Thai et al., 2019; Terrion & Ashforth, 
2002; Thomas et al., 2020) or down the hierarchy (i.e., a leader with 
their followers; e.g., Avolio & Sosik, 1999; Cooper et al., 2018; Yam 
et al., 2018; Yam et al., 2019; see Kong et al., 2019, for a review). But 
because higher status and power entail a broader range of acceptable 
behavior (see Magee & Galinsky, 2008, for a review), it was possible that 
followers would not reap the same benefits if using humor with an au-
thority person higher in the hierarchy. Although upward follower 
sarcasm was technically risky because it flouted the traditional flow of 
information and communication (i.e., top-down; Anderson & Brown, 
2010; Shaw, 1964), and is generally not as easily understood nor 
appreciated as other forms of humor (Romeo & Cruthirds, 2006), Study 
1 findings suggest that leaders did not punish the follower who enacted 
the sarcasm (i.e., Player 2) nor the follower who laughed at it (i.e., 
Player 1). Thus, by allowing leaders and followers to save face (McGraw 
& Warren, 2010; Tynan, 2005) while maintaining a hint of dissent, 
followers influenced leaders’ behavior while avoiding retaliation or 
punishment. But, leaders’ pay decisions were not zero-sum, potentially 
dampening follower punishment effects. 
Finally, by outlining the role of leader moral identity, this research 
also contributes to the humor and behavioral ethics literatures. Recent 
Table 8 





b (SErobust) b (SErobust) 
Constant 4.09(0.22)*** 4.06(0.12)*** 
Follower sarcasm 0.09(0.03)** − 0.10(0.15) 
Presence of others 0.32(0.02)*** 0.33(0.15)* 
Follower sarcasm × presence of 
others 
– 0.33(0.11)* 
Leader gender − 0.19(0.15) − 0.20(0.14) 
Pseudo loglikelihood − 913.26 − 910.43 
AIC 1828.53 1822.86 
BIC 1832.74 1827.08 
Note. N = 501. 






















1 2 3 4 5
Follower Sarcasm
Private Public
Fig. 6. Effects of follower sarcasm and the presence of others on leader 
accountability (Study 4). 
Note. Bands denote 95% CIs. N = 501. 
15 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 501, and 1 covariate 
revealed power of greater than .80.  
16 A post-hoc power analysis with 0.05 alpha, N = 501, and 1 covariate 
revealed power greater than .80. 
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work has begun to explore humor and leader morality, including Yam 
et al. (2018) who showed that aggressive leader sense of humor increases 
follower deviance. However, the current research extends this line of 
work by showing that the mildly aggressive form of humor—follower 
sarcasm (Huang et al., 2015; Yam et al., 2018)—can also decrease leader 
deviance. Through the mechanism of accountability, Studies 2 through 3 
showed more definitive evidence that follower sarcasm decreases less 
moral leaders’ self-interested behavior in the form of excess pay relative 
to performance. These findings complement research that has largely 
documented follower responses to leader aggressive humor (e.g., Yam 
et al., 2018) or leader unethical behavior in response to more moral 
follower behavior (Ahmad et al., 2020). By showing a positive leader 
reaction to follower sarcasm in leaders with weak moral identity, these 
findings also extend recent research that has shown more moral leaders’ 
negative responses to follower humor (e.g., lack of humor appreciation; 
Yam et al., 2019). And in doing so, this research shows how situational 
factors such as follower sarcasm shape the effect moral identity has on 
leaders’ self-interested behaviors, adding to research showing how other 
factors (e.g., power) interact with moral identity to affect leader 
behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; DeCelles et al., 2012; Shao, Aquino, & 
Freeman, 2008). 
On a more general level, the bulk of existing humor research has 
studied the effects of humor on relationships (e.g., Cooper et al., 2018), 
(team) communication or performance (Lehmann-Willenbrock & Allen, 
2014), as well as attitudes and perceptions (e.g., Bitterly et al., 2017; 
Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2019; Evans et al., 2019). Although sarcasm has 
also been shown to increase creative behavior of the humor user and the 
recipient (Huang et al., 2015), and leader humor has been shown to 
affect follower deviant behavior (Yam et al., 2018), to my knowledge, 
research has not yet demonstrated how humor or sarcasm affects 
financial behavior. This is a particularly impressive pattern of effects, 
because the humor user here was also a lower power person, and thus, 
easily ignored; indeed, a common response when leaders have power is 
that they ignore the group’s collective interests (DeCelles et al., 2012; 
Keltner et al., 2003). 
Finally, a slightly different question is if the same communication 
benefits afforded by humor that facilitate followers’ upward communi-
cation may also cause leaders to deem the information as less veracious 
or requiring action (e.g., Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2019; Ford, 2000; 
Mallett, Ford, & Woodzicka, 2016; Thomas et al., 2020). If true, this 
could undermine the act and its long-term effectiveness. Thus, future 
work should test sarcasms’ potentially diminishing returns over time. 
11.2. Practical implications 
First, communicating up the hierarchy is risky (see Morrison, 2014, 
for a review). Using humor at work—particularly sarcasm—can also be 
risky (Bitterly et al., 2017; Evans et al., 2019; Gloor et al., 2021; Romeo 
& Cruthirds, 2006). However, employees may face fewer personal 
consequences if communicating up the hierarchy with humor. Although 
not explicitly tested here, based on recent research, I can also recom-
mend that employees further reduce the ‘risk’ of sarcasm and upward 
humor by telling appropriate sarcastic jokes (e.g., puns, like those tested 
here) and avoiding inappropriate jokes (e.g., references to minority 
groups and/or sexual humor; Bitterly et al., 2017; Thomas et al., 2020). 
Second, the humor tested in Studies 1–3 were jokes directed towards 
the leader—a requirement of sarcasm (Lee & Katz, 1998)—and they 
both alluded to the leader’s (under) performance but neither joke 
directly addressed leader morality or pay. Indeed, such jokes may be 
appraised as too personal or too psychologically close, thereby losing 
their humor (McGraw & Warren, 2010). As a result, leaders may inter-
pret such jokes as threatening, making them ineffective to improve 
leaders’ behavior—potentially exacerbating overpay if leaders feel 
threatened or illegitimate (de Cremer & van Dijk, 2005). Future research 
is needed to test these ideas. 
Third, the current research focused on pay because of its prevalence 
and relevance to modern organizational life. But less moral leaders may 
also commit immoral behavior in other domains (e.g., blaming a 
coworker for one’s own mistake; Ward & King, 2018). Indeed, high- 
power persons also commit immoral behaviors such as unwanted sex-
ual attention and harassment (Carlsen et al., 2018). However, humor 
becomes fundamentally unfunny if there is a threat of real harm 
(McGraw & Warren, 2010). If managing to maintain its levity, it may 
also empower bias, sexism, and prejudice (Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & 
Edel, 2008; Ford, Wentzel, & Lorion, 2001; Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, & 
Kochersberger, 2013; Thomas et al., 2020; Thomas & Esses, 2004). 
Hence, I urge caution in using humor or sarcasm if the potential for real 
harm is present. 
Fourth, although not studied here, given the intrapersonal stress- 
relief (Ford, Ferguson, Brooks, & Hagadone, 2004) and task-related 
benefits of humor (e.g., persistence; Cheng & Wang, 2015), even if 
sarcasm does not reduce leaders’ immoral behaviors, it may offer 
important benefits for humor users. 
Finally, by highlighting sarcasm as a strategy to facilitate fair leader 
pay, I do not intend to imply that the onus should be on followers to 
ensure their leaders behave morally. Indeed, the bulk of leaders’ pay is 
typically determined by contract, which followers cannot influence 
regardless of how much sarcasm they use. But, increasingly popular 
work arrangements (e.g., contracting) entail greater flexibility and au-
tonomy over pay allocation in projects, income inequalities that accu-
mulate over time (Gill, 2002). Thus, I aim to proactively arm followers 
with evidence-based agency to reduce leaders’ overpay and its negative 
consequences. 
11.3. Strengths, limitations, and future directions 
This research provided causal evidence via experiments (in Studies 
1–3), a method necessary to avoid confounds that would pervade such a 
study in organizational contexts. For example, employees may be 
generally less likely to engage in humor up the hierarchy compared with 
down the hierarchy (Lundberg, 1969). Although followers may 
communicate more up the hierarchy when they feel psychologically safe 
to do so (Walumbwa & Schaubroeck, 2009), that is, when they are in a 
team climate characterized by “respect and trust…that situations are 
secure, predictable, and clear” (Edmondson, 1999; Kahn, 1990, p. 705), 
employees may also feel more psychologically safe by using more humor 
(e.g., see Romero & Pescosolido, 2008). Thus, by testing these ideas via 
experiments, this research aimed to enrich an area of research on 
communication up the hierarchy often referred to as “voice” that is 
rarely experimental (although notable exceptions include Burris, Rock-
mann, & Kimmons, 2017; Fast, Burris, & Bartel, 2014; and Lam, Lee, & 
Sui, 2019), by developing a novel chat room paradigm to enhance both 
experimental and mundane realism. 
Although a key strength of Study 4 was showing the influence of 
follower sarcasm in real interactions, I cannot rule out participants’ 
misattribution (i.e., recalling a joke by someone other than their fol-
lower; see Bitterly et al., 2017, for a similar discussion). Paired with the 
causal links and converging results with Study 3, however, this potential 
threat seems less concerning. 
I studied sarcasm and its effects in two different countries in an 
attempt to show some evidence of generalizability (i.e., in the U.S. in 
Studies 1–3 and in the U.K. in Study 4). Despite differences in humor 
styles (i.e., more aggressive, sarcastic humor in the U.K. than in the U.S.; 
Kaniuka et al., 2020), both are Western, industrialized, educated, rich, 
and democratic countries (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Thus, future research should explicitly test sarcasm as an intervention 
for leader moral behavior or overpay in other contexts (e.g., Asia; see 
Yam, Gloor, & Liu, 2021). 
Finally, this research focused on one self-interested behavior: self- 
pay. Because leaders make daily decisions related to other kinds of 
resource allocation (see Kelemen, Matthews, & Breevaart, 2020), I 
encourage future work to explore if these decisions are similarly 
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influenced by follower sarcasm. 
12. Conclusions 
Findings from three behavioral experiments and a field study showed 
that leaders engage in overpay, but follower sarcasm reduces it, espe-
cially for leaders with weak moral identity and when leaders are 
accountable to their followers. Hence, as implied in the title: talk is 
cheap, because it is arguably free. However, talk is also valuable, 
because a swift instance of follower sarcasm can reduce leader overpay 
by increasing accountability. 
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